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Abstract
This paper assesses leading Japanese philosophical thought since the onset of 
Japan’s modernity: namely, from the Meiji Restoration (1868) onwards. It argues that 
there are lessons of global value for AI ethics to be found from examining leading 
Japanese philosophers of modernity and ethics (Yukichi Fukuzawa, Nishida Kitaro, 
Nishi Amane, and Watsuji Tetsurō), each of whom engaged closely with Western 
philosophical traditions. Turning to these philosophers allows us to advance from 
what are broadly individualistically and Western-oriented ethical debates regarding 
emergent technologies that function in relation to AI, by introducing notions of com-
munity, wholeness, sincerity, and heart. With reference to AI that pertains to profile, 
judge, learn, and interact with human emotion (emotional AI), this paper contends 
that (a) Japan itself may internally make better use of historic indigenous ethical 
thought, especially as it applies to question of data and relationships with technol-
ogy; but also (b) that externally Western and global ethical discussion regarding 
emerging technologies will find valuable insights from Japan. The paper concludes 
by distilling from Japanese philosophers of modernity four ethical suggestions, or 
spices, in relation to emerging technological contexts for Japan’s national AI poli-
cies and international fora, such as standards development and global AI ethics 
policymaking.
Keywords AI ethics · Governance · Japan · Emotional AI · Synthetic personalities
1 Introduction
Focusing on Japan, this paper examines what leading Japanese philosophers of 
modernity have to offer academic and policy-based ethical understanding of arti-
ficial intelligence (AI), here paying particular attention to ‘emotional AI’ that 
involves discerning facial expressions, gaze direction, gestures, voices, and other 
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biometrics. This is a narrow form of AI, reliant on diverse sensors and actuators, 
and (typically, but not always) supervised machine learning, along with a range of 
neural network types (including convolutional, region, and recurrent) depending 
on what is being sensed and in what context (Altenberger & Lenz, 2018; Lipton 
et al., 2015; Ren et al., 2015). These systems may be used at macro- and micro-
scales, such as core infrastructure in surveillance-oriented “smart city” devel-
opments, and in domestic and worn (and less frequently, embedded) contexts. 
Growing in popularity across the world, use cases for emotional AI include (but 
are not limited to) augmentation of facial recognition and surveillance of cities 
and core infrastructure (such as transport hubs, schools, workplaces, and interac-
tive out-of-home advertising); private spaces open to the public (such as retail 
and sports stadia); and more private experiences (such as enhanced interaction 
with devices and media content; synthetic personalities and embodied AI assis-
tants; toys and entertainment; wellbeing apps and hardware; in-car analytics; and 
companionship in elderly care homes). In brief, wherever there is perceived value 
in gauging and interacting with human emotion, there is organisational interest in 
deploying emotional AI.
Arguing there are lessons of global social value to be found in Japanese ethi-
cal thought from its traditional beliefs and their modern articulations, particularly 
because leading thinkers of the modern period engaged so closely with a variety 
of Western philosophical traditions, the paper contends that (a) Japan itself may 
internally make better use of its historic indigenous ethical thought, especially as 
it applies to question of data and relationships with technology; but also (b) that 
externally, Western and global ethical discussion regarding emerging technolo-
gies will find valuable insights from Japanese philosophical notions (or “Spices”) 
of community, wholeness, sincerity, and heart. Applying these Spices to emo-
tional AI assists with de-Westernisation of the ethical conundrums arising from 
emotional AI, including the need to consider civic as well as personal concerns 
about usage in public spaces; the objectification and decontextualization arising 
from machine learning of emotions; avoidance of presumption of intimacy with 
others; and the complexity of interactions with synthetic personalities as affect-
based systems grow more sophisticated.
The paper has three key components: (1) it outlines international and national 
influences on modern Japanese AI ethics policy; (2) it investigates the hybridi-
sation of dominant Japanese ethical beliefs with Western discourses during and 
after the Meiji Restoration (1868) that initiated Japan’s modernity; and (3) it gen-
erates global ethical lessons (or “Spices”) in relation to emerging technological 
contexts for Japan’s national AI policies and international fora, such as stand-
ards development and global AI ethics policymaking. For academic thought, the 
paper amplifies and advances arguments regarding the value of non-Western phi-
losophies in assessing ethics and technology. Distilled into the four Spices, the 
paper provides practical ethical recommendations for policymakers in Japan and 
international governance bodies. Undoubtedly, given space for investigation into 
a fuller range of Japanese philosophers, more spices might be found. Yet, like 
Japanese food spicing that is careful and thought-out, the four selected have wide 
applicability.
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2  Influences on Japan’s AI Ethics Policies
The Japanese government has long been interested in guiding and funding AI 
development, not least Japan’s Super City Initiative, involving a bill passed in 
2020 by Japan’s Diet (its national legislature) for so-called super cities. In prac-
tice, this meant local governments are selected by the central government to work 
with private technology firms to create plans for their own smart city, a point 
amplified by Japan’s Cabinet Office that ‘is promoting the Super City Initiative 
that realizes the ideal future society in advance through cutting‐edge technology 
and bold deregulation in the Fourth Industrial Revolution’ (Government of Japan, 
2020). Other notable policy initiatives include the Humanoid Robotics Project 
in 1998, funded by Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) 
and New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organization (NEDO). 
Prime Minister Abe’s Innovation 25 programme that began in 2007 is also note-
worthy, given its ambition to reinvent Japanese society by 2025 by reversing 
declining birth rate and accommodating an aging population. Abe’s subsequent 
programme, Society 5.0, similarly envisions an ‘inclusive socio-economic sys-
tem’, being based on big data analytics, artificial intelligence (AI), the Internet of 
Things, and robotics technologies, all intersecting with emotional AI.
There are many influences on contemporary AI ethics policy in Japan, of a 
western liberal and arguably neo-liberal tenor. These influences include interna-
tional bodies, such as the World Economic Forum (WEF) and Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), all based on progress through 
liberal economic trade. Others are international in the form of technology stand-
ards groups, such as the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 
that have expanded their interests to encompass ethical questions regarding the 
design and implementation of automated technologies. As will be developed in 
this paper, there are notable national and regional influences on AI ethics policy 
in Japan, not least by the EU, UK, USA, and Canada.
Ethical buzzwords employed by intra-Japanese agencies are also familiar, 
being arguably Western and liberal in flavour. For example, Japan’s Council 
for Artificial Intelligence Technology Strategy, published by the Japan Cabinet 
Office, advocates three core values of (1) dignity, (2) diversity and inclusion, and 
(3) sustainability (Cabinet Office, 2019). Japan’s initiatives recognise and con-
verge with OECD and UNESCO international policy conversation on AI ethics 
(Expert Group on Architecture for AI Principles to be Practiced, 2021). Like 
Europe and most other regions, Japan seeks to balance pro-social implementa-
tion of AI with allowing businesses to innovate with AI-related technologies. 
To this end, Japan’s Expert Group report draws extensively on reports from the 
UK government, EU, USA, and international groups such as IEEE (especially its 
P7000 series of standards). Similarly, Japan’s Cabinet Office draft of the Social 
Principles of Human-centric AI notes that as AI principles are being discussed in 
many countries, organisations, and companies, ‘it is important to build an inter-
national consensus through open discussions as soon as possible and to share it 
internationally as a non-regulatory and non-binding framework’ (Cabinet Office, 
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2019: 10). Yet, Japan’s current policies are somewhat conventional, drawing upon 
and replicating other global content to allow Japan access to global markets and 
to help generate safe and socially valuable services. For instance, Japan’s align-
ment and adequacy with leading data protection regimes, such as the EU (Japan 
is a ‘third country’ under the EU’s data protection rules), means that personal 
data can legally move between the EU and Japan. Notably, the EU’s General Data 
Protection Regulation may be characterised as what Daly (2021) argues to be 
‘regulatory capitalism’, simultaneously a way of encouraging neo-liberal norms 
and constraining it where it is not desirable for the EU’s single market. At heart, 
EU AI and data protection entails (among other values) statements of respect for 
human dignity, private life, self-determination, and protection of personal data 
(European Commission, 2021: §3.5, 11), a liberal worldview, whose principles 
would benefit from Japanese and hybrid thought as they apply to AI ethics and 
emotional AI applications.
Of themselves, the ideas of dignity, diversity, inclusion, and sustainability, found 
in Japan’s Council for Artificial Intelligence Technology Strategy, will be familiar 
to Western readers of Philosophy & Technology. More novel are the questions of (a) 
where is Japan’s own normative contribution and, (b) when identified, what might 
this add to serious global conversation (rather than that led by public relations) 
about ethics and technology? The absence of Japan’s own normative contribution, 
especially to global debate, is evident in the discussion by an expert in Europe and 
Japan data protection adequacy, Hiroshi Miyashita. Miyashita (2021) discusses the 
application of the Council of Europe’s Convention 108 + , its emphasis on human 
dignity, and that an individual should not be treated as a mere object. Importantly, 
Miyashita argues that ‘If European data protection laws are attached to the dignitar-
ian philosophy, there is no such novel philosophy in Japan and probably not in most 
Asian countries’ (2021: 7). For Miyashita, ‘European human dignity has been incor-
porated into Japan with the addition of Japanese spices’ (ibid), not least through 
emphasis on the principle of respect.
There is a political and industrial dimension to such importing (and adaptation) 
of European normativity. If there is dissonance between the language employed in 
Japan’s AI ethics policies and normative context by those being asked to install this 
in their designs and technologies, there is a risk that it will be seen solely through 
the prism of compliance, rather than something more moral and pro-social. Murata 
(2019) for example sees the tendency for data protection to be framed as pro-econ-
omy law rather than pro-rights law. The minimal presence of local belief discourses 
may lower the chance of Japanese societal buy-in of global work on AI and technol-
ogy ethics, for example, in terms of business culture, technology design, data protec-
tion enforcement, or use of new technologies in urban contexts. Indeed, Robertson 
(2018: 127) observes that while human rights are formally adhered to, the Japanese 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs pays lip service to the Universal Declaration on Human 
Rights, and that they are regarded ‘by the state as pertaining to the universe outside 
of Japan’. Yet, with better recognition of the ethical universe within Japan, there 
is an opportunity to include lessons from Japan in global work on how to design, 
deploy and govern technologies that have consequences for human life. Indeed, a 
range of studies point out that differences between regional philosophical traditions 
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lead to value differences on matters such as data privacy, not least due to questions 
of cultural differences (ÓhÉigeartaigh et al., 2020). It is to Japan’s different domi-
nant belief systems and ethical practices that this paper now turns.
3  Belief Systems and Practices
Unlike the West where people mostly identify with one religion (such as Christian-
ity), if they are at all religious, Japanese people tend towards syncretic views where 
religious beliefs are blended and personalised. A 2018 survey by the Government 
of Japan’s Agency for Culture Affairs found that 69.0 percent of the population 
practices Shintoism (Japan’s national religion); 66.7 percent Buddhism; 1.5 percent 
Christianity, and 6.2 percent other religions (Agency for Culture Affairs, 2019). To 
these, Confucianism can be added, although it is a philosophy of life rather than 
religion. Tracing of syncretism between these systems is complex work, far beyond 
the remit of this paper, but it is noteworthy that syncretism of the systems them-
selves began before dominant religions arrived in Japan, with expert scholarship 
for example being divided on whether Shinto (widely understood as Japan’s indig-
enous religion) is an extension of Buddhism, even finding historical evidence that 
Shinto was originally another term for Taoism in China (Toshio et al., 1981). Simi-
larly, before Confucianism reached Japan, there had already been complementarity 
and mutual harmony between Buddhism and Confucianism in China (Vermeersch, 
2020), with Confucianism then overlapping with Japanese Buddhism on arriving in 
Japan (Suzuki, 1959). Thus, while this paper cannot adequately address the intrica-
cies of the syncretisation of Shintoism, Confucianism, Buddhism, and other influ-
ential outlooks such as Daoism, it should be recognised that there is great historical 
complexity regarding internal religious change, mutual influence, ability to maintain 
coherence of identity in diverse political regimes, and geopolitical change.
Beyond syncretisation, Lennerfors and Murata (2019) remind us that philoso-
phy was a term imported into Japan around the Meiji era, meaning that pre-existing 
ethical theory should be interpreted through ‘historical records, legal codes, myths, 
religious books, narratives, poems, plays and so on since the early eighth century’ 
(2019: 8). Lennerfors and Murata (2019) also point to Masahide Satō and Watsuji 
Tetsurō as having done a great deal of the historical work in this regard. Certainly, 
ethics was lived and practiced but, arguably, it was not abstracted and systematised.
Today, Japan does not have one ethical system or outlook, which means that 
attempts to label and essentialise Japanese ethical and spiritual values are oversim-
plistic. Nevertheless, religion and belief matter, and it is notable that ‘the oldest past 
is still present, side by side with the newest forms of modern civilization’ (Nishida, 
2003 [1958]: 57). As any resident or visitor of Japan will know, micro-Shinto 
shrines sit alongside (and within) the high modern architecture of Tokyo’s busi-
ness district. Justice cannot be done to the complex histories and inter-relationships 
of these outlooks, but for introductory purposes, Shinto is based on reverence for 
nature, simplicity, completeness, unity, the natural sacredness of Japan itself, deep 
respect for ancestors, and spirits in the form of kami—that may be of places, natu-
ral forces, or things (Hardacre, 2017). Famously, Shinto also attributes living souls 
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to plants, natural phenomena, and everyday objects, hence international interest in 
Japan’s relationship with technology and robots (Kitano, 2007). While this animism 
has been critiqued on grounds that it legitimates deceptive use of technology, this 
paper will argue that sensitivity to the blurring of objects and subjects is of ethi-
cal value in Spice 4 and emergent human-AI relations (sensitivity). Quite different 
from Japan’s native Shinto, there are reasons why Confucianism was well-received 
in Japan. This is due in part to its prescriptive behaviour, but also because it reso-
nated with Shinto’s belief in showing respect for ancestors, care and honouring of 
parents and family, and emphasis on ritual and harmony. Factors of order and hierar-
chy certainly exist, but mention should also be made of its anthropocosmic outlook 
(Tucker, 1998) that removes human-kind’s sovereign status as the centre of exist-
ence, as this will recur in several of the four Spices later in this paper. Whereas Con-
fucianism is based on social harmony and the public good, and Shinto on Kami and 
vitalism, Buddhism is preoccupied with impermanence and self-realisation (Mitchell 
& Jacoby, 2014). Having arrived in the form of Mahayana Buddhism from Korea in 
the early to mid-sixth century (Murata, 2019), this developed into Zen Buddhism. 
With later implication for Spice 2, this values intuition and suggestive expres-
sion (rather than objectivity and explicitness). As with Shinto and Confucianism, 
this Zen Buddhism appeals to larger non-human “wholes,” effectively dethroning 
humans in favour of an ecological view that accepts that various modes of existence 
are fused together.
4  Hybridity and the Japanese Modernity
Having very briefly introduced dominant Japanese ethical beliefs and practices, this 
paper now investigates their hybridisation with Western discourses that, in turn, 
initiated Japan’s modernity. Japan’s initial experiences with modernity are inextri-
cable from the Meiji Restoration (1868), a period of profound social change that 
involved high engagement with the West and importation of influential liberal ethi-
cal thought. Yet, as will be developed, it also involved engagement with philoso-
phies other than political philosophy. Here, Japanese philosophers such as Yukichi 
Fukuzawa, Nishida Kitaro, Nishi Amane, and Watsuji Tetsurō,1 among others, 
built philosophical bridges between the West and Japan, drawing upon, and argu-
ably extending, the work of Germanic philosophers (such as Kant, Herder, Hegel, 
Nietzsche, and Heidegger), and several phenomenologists and pragmatists. Indeed, 
Japanese philosophers Tanabe Hajime, Kuki Shūzō, and Miki Kiyoshi made trips 
to study with philosophers such as Heidegger (Lennerfors & Murata, 2019). The 
interest in German philosophy is due in large part to Japan’s interest in Germany’s 
rapid modernisation, but also fertile spiritual overlaps with older traditions present 
1 Japanese names are historically written with the family name preceding their given name. Thus, the 
author Watsuji Tetsurō will be cited by the family name Watsuji. Where an author publishes family name 
last, they will be cited and recorded in the reference list accordingly.
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in Japan. This engagement involved both praise and criticism, but also a hybridising 
with longstanding philosophies of Shintoism, Buddhism, and Confucianism.
4.1  Modernity, Liberalism, and the Meiji Restoration: Japanese Sprit, Western 
Technology
Japan’s Meiji Restoration (1868) saw Japan modernise and industrialise quickly 
to respond to US and foreign advancements. This reconsidered not only physical 
and military strength, but also societal and intellectual orientation. Broadly a rejec-
tion of Tokugawa feudalism (1603–1868) and its period of Confucian dominance, 
we should be sensitive to the fact that there existed internal criticism of Tokugawa 
Confucian thought (Zhu Xi’s Confucianism). Strains included Ancient Learning or 
kogaku, Native Learning or kokugaku, and the Dutch Learning or rangaku. These 
are significant because of ongoing reinterpretation of Confucian thought in context 
of changing social realities, early engagement with systematised Western philoso-
phies, philosophical allowance of scientific (materialist) worldviews and methods, 
but most importantly the initiation of the transition to the modern nation-based Japa-
nese society in the Meiji period. This includes separation of the private sphere from 
the political, representing a step in the formation of the so-called modern individual 
(Culiberg, 2015). The Meiji Restoration itself was a period of social transition to one 
that recognised Western liberal prowess, yet also sought to maintain high national 
values. Drawing from Europe and the USA, Japan adopted technologies, business 
methods, military techniques, education, agricultural techniques, and economic gov-
ernance ideas. In addition to engaging with secular, scientific, technological, indus-
trial, and cultural developments from the West, there was a high level of engage-
ment with Western philosophies. This is significant because this engagement was 
not detached from Japan’s rapid societal change. Instead, leading thinkers and phi-
losophers were directly connected to policy figures initiating and leading societal 
change. This involved embracing Western concepts such as Shakai (society), Tetsug-
aku, (philosophy), Risei (the reason), and Kagaku (science), with indigenous terms 
augmented by Western concepts, such as Gijyutsu (technology), Shizen (nature), and 
Rinri (ethics).
The intention of the Meiji Constitution was not an emulation of the West, but 
to learn and surpass it and, under the aegis of wakon yōsai (Japanese spirit, West-
ern technology), articulate a liberal modernity independent of the West. Undergoing 
the Meiji Restoration, the transformation of Japan was viewed as a social experi-
ment that, if successful, would reveal the universality of the principles of values of 
democratization and economic liberalism. After all, if a principle is universal, it can-
not belong to the West. In a paeon to democracy, liberalism, education, technology, 
and progress, Yukichi Fukuzawa opens his An Encouragement of Learning with 
‘Heaven, it is said, does not create one person above or below another,’ that ‘we are 
all equal and there is not a discussion between high and low’ and that we can satisfy 
our daily needs through our own work ‘as long as we do not infringe upon the rights 
of others’ (2012 [1872–6]: 3).
 A. McStay 
1 3
Fukuzawa is stinging in his critique of Confucian dominance, stating it as a 
degenerate influence and ‘that Chinese philosophy as the root of education was 
responsible for our obvious shortcomings’ (2007 [1893]: 215). Also, for Fukuzawa, 
until number and reason were embraced, ‘Japan could not assert herself among the 
great nations of the world’ (ibid). Fukuzawa also takes aim at Shintoism, or the 
attribution of a nature or soul that animates an object, due to a view of the natural 
world that sees it as abounding with the spirits of the gods (kami-gami). Were Fuku-
zawa solely an academic philosopher, the embracing of liberal beliefs might not be 
that significant. However, as a public figure with direct influence on policymaking, 
Fukuzawa was a central figure in Japan’s modernisation.
Nishi Amane was one of the first scholars to be sent abroad (in the 1860s) to study 
Western social sciences (Havens, 1970), returning with Auguste Comte’s positivism 
and John. S. Mill’s accounts of utilitarianism. Nishi’s significance is underlined by 
Havens (1970), who remarks that Nishi is ‘commonly regarded as the father of mod-
ern Japanese philosophy’ (1970: 218). Keimo (enlightened) scholars, of which Nishi 
was one, were an intelligentsia that sought to study, translate, and import Western 
philosophies, especially political philosophies and concepts of individual rights and 
obligations, and natural and international law. Despite being steeped in Sung Confu-
cianism, Nishi took great interest in Western principles of economics, social theory, 
philosophy, and countries such as the US and England [sic] that ruled by popular 
will (Nishi, cited by Havens, 1970: 44). Also noteworthy, given this paper’s earlier 
international policy discussion, is Nishi’s embrace of justice, fairness, freedom, and 
equal rights. What Nishi cites as English ideas were especially influential given its 
origination of economic liberalism (Adam Smith was of course Scottish). Although 
high regard of the English would be severely tested by English opium trading (and 
diplomacy through military and economic strength), Japanese scholars valued free-
dom, natural law (rights born from nature), ethical progress, universal ethical princi-
ples, and the innate wrongness of trading in freedom.
For a paper about ethics and emergent technology, this matters because it was 
in these few years (the late 1860s and 1870s) that seeds were sown in Japan for 
ethical principles familiar to the West and modern data protection experts. These 
include the idea ‘that self-awareness of personal rights must accompany the tech-
nological and institutional revolution that was taking place’ in the 1870s (Havens, 
1970: 81). This transplanting was not immediate because equality butted against the 
social hierarchy models of the Tokugawa era, the period before the Meiji Restora-
tion. Yet, Mill’s On Liberty (especially notable for modern privacy and data pro-
tection scholars), Representative Government, and Principles of Political Economy 
were translated into Japanese by 1875, reappearing in many other collections by the 
end of the century (Havens, 1970: 142). However, Mill’s popularity might also be 
explained in part by utilitarianism being a social rather than individualist philoso-
phy, thus its principles not being entirely alien to Confucianism. However, although 
Western and liberal ideas were influential, they were certainly not universal in 
appeal to Japanese people. For instance, during the Meiji period, although there was 
respect for the UK’s achievements, contemporary Nihonjinron writing (the genre of 
writing focused on Japanese identity) lamented the dark, polluted, industrial cities of 
England, commercialism, the impact of these on Japanese values, how to confront 
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modernity, and what progress looks like when modernity is balanced with Japanese 
‘superiority’ (Goto-Jones, 2009: 61).
5  Community Ethics
Given the political, intellectual, and technological exchanges with the West, the 
1800s engendered fertile hybridisation between longstanding Japanese belief sys-
tems and Western thought. In critical dialogue with Western individualism, post-
Meiji thought often re-stated the value of community-based ethics. For example, 
Watsuji Tetsurō (1996 [1937]) sought a modern society based on inter-connections 
between people and a somewhat ecological view where ethics and values grow from 
connected contexts. Indeed, very relevant to today, Watsuji (1961) wrote directly 
about climate and humankind, and the need to de-centre ‘man’ [sic] from human 
existence, to better recognise the role of environments. Certainly, connected con-
texts mean groups of people, and human-made infrastructure that connects people 
(such as transport and media), but its significance is broader. Antagonistic to the 
West, Watsuji argued that ethics has been misconceived as a problem of individual 
consciousness and isolated egos. Ethics for Watsuji, are found in the ‘in-between-
ness’ of people through communitarian interconnectedness. Later to be argued as 
the first of the four Spices (community), this is a fundamental point: ethics for Wat-
suji, a leading Japanese philosopher, are primarily about connections and context, 
not the self and egoism.
While conservative, there is also a deep pragmatism in its contextualism and 
social relativism. Values are neither found nor forever cast but grow from the char-
acter of given collectives, which in Lennerfors’ (2019) reading of Watsuji are milieu 
inextricable from technologies (with transport being a practical point of discussion 
for Watsuji). Today, the growth and creative dynamics of Confucianism are noted 
by Wong (2012) who points out that harmony and agreement mean different things 
in Confucianism. Agreement leads to mutual reinforcement, rather than growth, 
with the complementarity of cooking and music being useful analogies to counter 
similarity and agreement. As an ongoing dynamic process, harmony entails ongo-
ing negotiation and adjustment between individuals and their community (Li, 2006; 
Wong, 2012). This is a curious point of ethical overlap between pragmatism and 
the Confucian-inspired Watsuji that are both sceptical that abstract normativity 
may provide adequate guidance to the complexities of any given societal formation. 
Importantly too, this social and contextual view of ethics means that both the state 
and its legal structures are not the arbiters of ethics. This is because, for Watsuji, 
ethics must be of the community, its shared history and hopes for the future, and 
an expression of these. This dialectic is expressed in ningen that Watsuji states is 
neither society nor the individual human beings living within it, but ‘the intercon-
nection of acts,’ and the individual ‘that acts through these connections’ (ibid: 19).
Watsuji sought to bridge Japanese and Western thought, in part by seeking latent 
collectivist truths in Western philosophy. For example, on Kant’s writing about sub-
jectivity, empirical idealism (that all we know immediately is the existence of our 
own minds and our temporally ordered mental states), and the noumenal (that which 
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exists independent of human sensing), Watsuji argues that in this dualism the ‘indi-
vidualistic/holistic structure of ningen was already imperceptibly grasped by Kant’ 
(ibid: 32). This is a creative interpretation, given Kant’s (1983 [1793]) accounts of 
freedom, individualism, autonomy, and the categorical imperative, where a person 
uses reasons to arrive at principles that a person believes to be objective for all. Cri-
tique of individualism continues in Watsuji’s reading of phenomenology, individual 
moral consciousness, Heidegger, and the Cartesian ego, with Watsuji problematis-
ing the beginning of inquiry from individual consciousness itself. Refuting individ-
ual consciousness as the basis of ethics he urges appreciation of in-betweenness as 
that which orients and connects people.
There are, then, important practicalities for the stereotypes of Western individual-
ism and Japanese (or worse, Eastern) collectivism. This must be rejected, because 
Watsuji does not argue for community-determinism, although in accounting for the 
necessary contradiction in ningen in relation to Western phenomenology and liberal 
thought, he certainly takes shots at individualism. What is key and unique is that 
Western moral philosophy has, for the most part, assumed that people are individu-
als who go about setting up moral communities, whereas for Watsuji we are both 
social and individual in the embrace of a necessary contradiction. This might seem 
obvious in that “Of course ethics is about groups, connections, co-emergent behav-
iour, and context,” but this is not how dominant Western liberal normativity works. 
Rather, it typically champions individual moral choices, freedom, autonomy, and 
self-determination (all assuming no harm to others). While not a polar difference, 
as Watsuji sees the social and the individual, the community-based view of ethics is 
different from the more familiar liberal outlook. As to why this matters for a paper 
about ethics, governance, and emergent technologies, we might recollect that gov-
ernance of data typically rests on the premise of personal data and self-determina-
tion. Addressed later, how are data ethics affected if a community-based perspective 
is also seen as valuable, one that admits that connections and contexts play a key 
role in determining what exists for individuals?
6  Modernity of a Buddhist Sort
Keeping in mind that this paper first explained the importation of liberal political 
and individualist philosophies, and then considered Confucian-inspired community-
based reactions to these, we now turn to a Buddhist-inspired account. Nishida Kitarō 
rejects the suggestion that modernity is a Western experience, with his self-posed 
task being to re-articulate tradition in relation to emergent science and technol-
ogy, and to articulate an understanding of modernity that does not originate from 
the West. The context in which Nishida wrote is important because he is a philoso-
pher with a deep appreciation of Buddhism, yet also writing in the context of rapid 
technological development. In essence, he facilitated a rapprochement between 
Buddhism and modernity. For clarity, Nishida’s is not an updating of Buddhism 
in the context of modernity, but something else, a de-Westernising of modernity, 
to articulate the transformative energies of modernity in the context of Japanese 
belief, the timelessness of Buddhism, and connectedness with Japan’s cultural and 
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spiritual unfolding. The significance of his work is such in Japan that Nishida’s 
book, Intelligibility and the Philosophy of Nothingness, was translated in 1958 by 
The International Philosophical Research Association of Japan as a means of bridg-
ing understanding between Japan and the West. In short, Nishida acts as a two-way 
bridge between influential Western philosophical thought and key parts of Japanese 
ways of being. For example, Nishida (2003 [1958]: 16) remarks that Heidegger’s 
(2011 [1962]) work on Being is familiar to not just him, but other Japanese think-
ers. Indeed, the Kyoto School that Nishida founded would go on to have extensive 
engagement with Heidegger, both in-person and through his diverse output (Carter, 
2013).
6.1  “Wholes” and Dynamic Cosmologies
Nishida’s translator, Robert Schinzinger, flags a difference in style between Western 
and Japanese thought: whereas much Western thought aims for clarity, detail, and 
distinctiveness, Japanese thought appreciates the unspoken, allusion, hinting, and 
imagination. In part, this is an issue of politeness, or an orientation to not call things 
by name. One way of articulating this difference is ‘to think for the reader’ and ‘to 
permit the reader to think for himself’ (Schinzinger, in Nishida, 2003 [1958]: 3). A 
reason for this is the Japanese starting position of the whole and totality, not discrete 
parts. The issue of “wholes” and contexts, over parts and particularities, has already 
been a feature of this paper, but Schinzinger also remarks that, ‘In general it may be 
stated that Japanese thinking has the form of totality (Ganzheit): starting from the 
indistinct total aspect of a problem, Japanese thought proceeds to a more distinct 
total grasp by which the relationship of all parts becomes intuitively clear’ (Schinz-
inger, in Nishida, 2003 [1958]: 6).
To illustrate priority of the whole: ‘Ordinarily, we think of the material world, 
the biological world, and the historical world as being separate. But in my view, 
the historical world is the most concrete, and the material and biological worlds are 
abstractions. Thus, if we grasp the historical world, we grasp reality itself’ (Nishida, 
cited in Feenberg, 1995: 158). Nishida is not rejecting empiricism or reason, but 
refusing these as the basis or beginning of understanding. Rather, reason should be 
interpreted historically and as only one part of our lives.
Temptation to set up occidental/oriental stereotypes should be avoided. Emphasis 
on the primacy of history is well-rehearsed in Western thought, with many Japa-
nese philosophers being aware of European Counter-Enlightenment thought. Indeed, 
the eighteenth-century philosopher Giambattista Vico was a favourite of Watsuji 
([1937] 1996), having published a biographical essay about him. Vico was also a 
poster-thinker of resistance against the formalism of modernity by Japanese philos-
ophers, such as Hani Gorō, Miki Kiyoshi, Kobayashi Isami, Aoki Iwao, Shimizu 
Jun’ichi, and Shimizu Ikutarō (Campagnola, 2010).
On ethics, for Nishida (2003 [1958]), goodness and moral virtue are superseded 
by acknowledgement of a larger cosmological self-unfolding whole (or nothingness). 
The point about self-unfolding is an important one: virtue is not static, but dynamic. 
Cosmological pragmatism thus means that ethics are to change and re-description 
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through a pragmatism instigated by “nothingness” (recognition of teeming multi-
plicity, rather than emptiness or negation of life). This multiplicity comes from a 
‘unity of opposites’ as the many and one challenge each other, contradict and grow, 
arguably in a positive feedback loop—a condition of change and growth, and new 
forms of equilibrium and poiesis. The ethical difference is the ongoing deference to 
the totality (of infinite nothingness) that this takes place within. Yet, while respect-
ful, Nishida’s nothingness is also anti-conservative, finding resonance in the pro-
cess philosophies associated with James, Bergson, Whitehead, Stengers, and even 
Deleuze that sees form from formlessness. This is a positive account of cosmic self-
unfolding, one that will be argued below to be important for technology ethics due 
its anti-conservativism.
6.2  Cosmological Pragmatism
Nishida’s work on modernity and Buddhism perhaps helps explain the energy and 
divergent behaviours of Japanese culture (and why the traditional lives on alongside 
popular techno-culture). For Nishida, the nature of historical action is that the pre-
sent is an expression. Certainly, the past is with us and acts as strong presence, but 
for Nishida there is a deep and somewhat cosmological pragmatism at play. Given 
the absence of a transcendent elsewhere, a person makes and shapes this world 
(beginning with personal consciousness). In other words, one recognises the cos-
mological movement, connectedness with the past and others, but simultaneously 
takes a conscious stand in the unfolding. This dualism is a core characteristic: self-
hood is understood in relation to what it is created by (and informs). At the level of 
society and the state, this unity of opposites again provides a necessary contradic-
tion (as first raised with Watsuji) that allows for societal positive feedback and novel 
self-formation.
Applied, this helps explain Japan’s simultaneous embracing of the new, along-
side a deep appreciation of the absolute whole. Thus, for society to advance, it must 
be challenged by individuals, whose expressions are society challenging and grow-
ing itself. This is social, cultural, technological, and normative poiesis in action, 
but again taking place against reverence for the whole. A surface reading might see 
poetics of capitalism and creative destruction, but there is more to it. This is found in 
the negation of selfhood and realisation that individual expression (and the dynam-
ics of desire) is self-formation of the world.
Nishida’s (2003 [1958]) Western-friendly articulations of Buddhism lend a frame 
for understanding Japan’s capacity for self-reinvention, renewal, and engendering 
of technically infused societal formations. Japanese ethics also have a very practi-
cal dimension because of its Buddhist influence and its cosmological pragmatism. 
Certainly, the past is carried into the future, but both are part of a larger cosmo-
logical self-unfolding whole (or nothingness). To again quote Nishida, ‘In moving 
from form to form the world constantly renews itself’ (2003 [1958]: 60). Self-for-
mation of the unfolding whole is at the same time self-expression, which provides 
a delicious paradox resolved for Nishida at the level of consciousness. As one is 
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simultaneously environment and subject, the colliding point is consciousness (which 
is nothingness being aware of itself).
Ethics, too, are subject to re-description. Again, echoing pragmatist ethics, 
Nishida says, ‘Something like moral reality can be comparted with an eternally 
unfinished piece of art’ (2003 [1958]: 118). There is a clear bridge to Western 
understanding by recognising the deep connection with pragmatism and its context-
based passion, care, and willingness to defend, even when ethics are ethnocentric 
and local in nature (Rorty, 1989; Dewey, 1995 [1908]; James, 2000 [1907]). Like-
wise, for Nishida, also unashamed of historical relativism, there is ‘neither “good” 
nor “evil”’, but a constant enveloping of Universals (Nishida, 2003 [1958]: 130).
The need to begin with the whole rather than its parts is a fundamental orient-
ing point for Japanese beliefs and, as argued below, the second of the four ethical 
Spices (wholeness). As Nishida (2003 [1958]) notes, the issue of wholeness (Gan-
zheit) is not reliant on any one Japanese belief, but is a starting position for much 
Japanese thought. In Shinto, for example, Kami is both hidden yet complementary 
to material life, and exists as a singular divinity that manifests in multiple forms and 
items of daily use. The Zen Buddhist dimension also alludes to wholes rather than 
descriptive specifics, with this interest in wholes lending a highly non-conservative 
character that recognises the contingency of moments, circumstance, and contexts. 
This whole has characteristics of immanence, providing for a cosmological pragma-
tism. This is because as there is no transcendent elsewhere, people make and shape 
this world. Also, for society to advance, it must be challenged by individuals, whose 
expressions are the “whole” challenging and growing itself. Deeply contextual, this 
pragmatic view of ethics means that both the state and its legal structures are not the 
arbiters of ethics, but values co-created by citizens and non-citizen dialectics on any 
given social arrangement (ningen).
Neither cosmological pragmatism, nor the creative dynamics of Watsuji’s nin-
gen (self/community dialectic), accord easily with trans-contingent hard-won human 
rights. Usefully, Morita (2012) does not see international human rights as incompat-
ible with “Asian values,” but argues that universal human rights must be justified in 
a region’s own terms and perspectives. This sits well with wider suggestions on ethi-
cal pluralism (Ess, 2020) and scope for the same ethics to be meaningfully adhered 
to for different cultural reasons (Hongladarom, 2016). There is a danger that this is 
an ethical bodge, with ÓhÉigeartaigh et  al. (2020) and Wong (2009) raising con-
cern that shared norms with different justifications is an inadequate outcome. Yet, 
as ÓhÉigeartaigh et  al. (2020) also argue, this paper believes that an overlapping 
consensus is preferable to either (1) no consensus, or (2) a fight to impose one’s 
own belief system. Pragmatically oriented, it also contends that lack of willing-
ness to update ethical positions and ideological entrenchment must be resisted, in 
favour of ongoing alertness to what may be learned from the other, perhaps espe-
cially so when new technological applications raise novel ethical questions. With 
regional justification in place, Morita observes that ‘an overlapping consensus in the 
norms of human rights may emerge from these self-searching exercises and mutual 
dialogue’ (Morita, 2012: 360). The ethical recommendation that flows from this is 
that while Zen Buddhist-inspired ethics butts against deontic principles in human 
rights, this may be seen as an opportunity to advance human rights in an age where 
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AI decision-making and emotional AI have scope to profoundly impact human life. 
Cosmological pragmatism also lends scope for soft ethics (Floridi, 2018), in that 
while the hard ethics of law and normative adherence remains paramount (ibid), 
there is also scope for dynamic contexts co-created by citizens and non-citizen dia-
lectics (ningen). The key ethical recommendation here is that dialectical spaces in 
cities and towns should be made for local agreements. While this will not breach 
more formal hard ethics (those enacted in law for example), it provides scope for 
dynamic local arrangements. This has resonance in the West with Green’s (2020) 
argument for a more direct democracy when it comes to companies seeking to roll 
out new data-oriented applications in towns and cities.
7  AI Ethics and Emotion: the Values of Japanese Spice
We can now consider global ethical lessons from classical and modern thought in 
Japan, in relation to emerging technological contexts. Indeed, for a country with 
beliefs that diverge so significantly from Europe’s, it seems strange that there is not 
more ‘Japanese spice.’ This is not to suggest that core beliefs should not be liberally 
minded, especially given (rightly or wrongly) the embrace of liberal ideas since the 
Meiji Restoration. Yet, more spice is required, especially given the close attention 
paid by Japanese philosophers to the facilitative and connectionist role that technol-
ogies play in the emergence and identity of societies. Argued below, this gives rise 
to an appreciation of the four spices of community, wholeness, sincerity, and heart. 
As remarked in “Introduction”, without a doubt, more spices may be found, yet the 
four identified here have wide applicability.
7.1  Spice 1: The Value of Including a Community‑Based Perspective
While Japan’s AI policies, and its implementation of international adequacy agree-
ments means that it has a formal ethical agreement with other regions, it is worth 
noting that “ethics” have a regional flavour. Ethics (Rinri) for Japan is indissociable 
from community-based perspectives, involving ways to order and maintain socially 
harmonious relationships. In relation to Society 5.0, a key Japanese policy develop-
ment for embedding AI systems in everyday life, Berberich et al. (2020) points to 
a ‘convivial’ society, in which humans and intelligent non-human information sys-
tems would live in harmony. Wong (2012) explains that for Confucians the principle 
of harmony stems from the ideal relationship between human beings and Heaven, 
which is harmonious rather than confrontation or divided. Critically, human beings 
and Heaven ‘are of the same nature ontologically’ (ibid: 72). To defuse potential 
for mystical readings of ‘Heaven’, Wong (2012) quotes Tu Weiming who, reminis-
cent of Watsuji, identifies Heaven as the ‘interconnectedness of all the modalities of 
existence defining the human condition’ and ‘an ever-expanding network of relation-
ships encompassing the family, community, nation, world, and beyond’ (Tu, 1993: 
141).
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Drawing on Confucian principles of harmony with nature, Society 5.0 sees scope 
for harmony with the information environment. This is facilitated by a view of 
nature (shinzen) that is more expansive than Western ideas that focus on the natu-
ral environment. This leads Berberich et al. (2020) to propose that ‘the addition of 
the concept of harmony to the discussion on ethical AI would be highly beneficial 
due to its centrality in East Asian cultures and its applicability to the challenge of 
designing AI for social good’ (2020: 1). In Japan, the term for harmony is Wa, which 
Berberich et al. (2020) argue to be the country’s most important value. Derived from 
the Confucian ideal of harmony, yet interacting with Shinto and other beliefs regard-
ing politeness, Wa developed its own character. Critically, Wa is not conformity, nor 
does it mean conservativeness. One may for example be respectful, yet clearly state 
one’s position, and Wa may also have a creative character that allows for newness 
and growth. For example, harmony or Wa may grow to encompass connectivity 
with non-human actors, involving diverse forms of AI systems. Be it human-sys-
tem or human–human, a harmony-based approach is one suited to the modern digi-
tal life. As outlined, for Watsuji (1996 [1937]), this is ‘in-betweenness’ of people 
established through communitarian interconnectedness, one that focuses on terms 
of connectivity and group dynamics, while not omitting individuals. Applied, this 
individual and collective dyad matters, especially for group harms caused by emer-
gent forms of civic profiling involving emotion and physiognomic-inspired profil-
ing of people in urban spaces (McStay, 2018). Whereas European Union AI and 
data protection typically entails personal data (that rests philosophically on rights 
to self-determination), a community-based perspective (or spice) is here argued to 
be of high ethical value. Japanese in-betweenness, or that which orients and exists 
between people, can be readily used to further universal arguments that values such 
as privacy are not only individual, but collective rights. Although human rights law 
recognises collectives (and dangers of seeing communities as corporate entities) 
(Dinstein, 1976), the Japanese “in-betweenist” spice makes a unique connectionist 
and “whole” based contribution. Expanded beyond use of emotional AI in urban 
contexts, Spice 1 also advances interests in algorithmic discrimination, undesirable 
social influence through networks, data justice concerns, and related concerns predi-
cated on mining the nature of social connections, big data, inferences from arguably 
non-personal data, and influence techniques derived from wholes and background 
life contexts.
7.2  Spice 2: The Value of Wholes and Aversion to Objectification
The critique of scientific reductionism is one associated in the West with mining, 
making present, excavation of subjectivity, and representing and mediating it via 
unnatural (distorted) means. For the West, this narrative finds the best expression in 
Heidegger’s (2013 [1941–2]; 1993 [1954]) critique of technology and technologi-
cal rationality, as the ways in which technical rationality equates being with pres-
ence and objectification. Given Japan’s belief systems and their modern articulations 
(that included engagement with Heidegger), the objectification critique, or Spice 
2, acquires extra importance given the upfront need to understand the whole from 
 A. McStay 
1 3
which a part is depicted. Connected, while one could argue that all scientific break-
throughs are due in some way to reduction of the world’s complexity, concern about 
machine learning techniques (especially bias in/bias out) is about what is lost from 
the social in the process of reduction. Similarly, critique of emotional AI frequently 
focuses on what is missed when geometries of facial expressions are extracted from 
the holism of lived contexts (Azari et al., 2020). Japanese need to acknowledge or 
allude to wholes (contexts) in art has bearing for Spice 2. In the discussion of art, 
for example, Nishida (2003 [1958]: 145–6) observes that Japanese art differs from 
Western modes of representation because it includes its background as an integral 
element, to acknowledge that from which form is drawn. This points to a need to 
grasp life itself, rather than particularities; an aversion to making all things present 
for open inspection; an appreciation for allusion, hinting and acknowledgement; and 
politeness, or that orientation that does not like to call things by name. Here, Spice 2 
takes the form of an ethical recommendation that global aversion to dehumanisation 
through objectification and decontextualization should recognise Japanese respect 
for the whole from which particularities are derived. Practically, particularities, in 
the form of machine decisions and judgements, might refer and “clearly allude” to 
the limits of contextual understanding by which judgements are made, so the back-
ground to the decision is clear. To an extent, this is a restatement of universal inter-
est in decisional transparency for governance of AI and big data processing. Yet, 
this paper takes seriously Morita’s (2012) argument that universal human rights may 
be justified in a region’s own terms and perspectives. A key reason is that such an 
approach allows the region and its regulators to take ownership of prescriptions, and 
to put them into practice in ways that have stronger normative resonance for citizens 
and those required to follow the rules.
7.3  Spice 3: The Value of Sincere Conduct
 Stereotypes of Western individualism and Eastern collectivism are sometimes used 
to signify that Westerners care more about privacy. However, Confucius’ statement 
that, ‘In practicing ritual one does not go beyond the proper measure, nor take liber-
ties with others, nor presume an intimacy with others’ is keenly significant for AI 
ethics and questions of emotion profiling (Confucius, cited in Gardner, 2014: 25). 
For Spice 3, the requirement of sincere conduct, this is an important set of practi-
cal sentiments with which to consider AI that uses individual and collective data: 
‘proper measure’ indicates respect for decorum; ‘take liberties’ means not to take 
advantage of, nor to abuse a social situation; and not to ‘presume an intimacy’ has 
special relevance for emotional AI. From the point of those who seek to engage with 
others, what is clear is that Confucianism demands good sincere conduct, potentially 
linking with ethical questions around transparency of intention, absence of manipu-
lative uses, and privacy.
Indeed, privacy and conduct may also be approached from a Buddhist orienta-
tion, given the property-based dimension to privacy evident in Nishida. Pointing 
out that ‘the individual has its subjective in the objective world’ (2003 [1958]: 202) 
and that, ‘Property must find its expression in the [objective] world, as belonging 
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to a certain individual; it must be recognised by the [objective] sovereignty’ (ibid 
[my emphasis]). In contrast to a natural rights account of privacy and selfhood, the 
implication of Nishida’s articulation of Buddhist principles in the modern context is 
that property is the foundation of privacy. Dedicated privacy scholars will be aware 
that privacy-as-property is an unpopular view (certainly in Europe) due to the mar-
ketisation of subjectivity, but perhaps the best way of reading Nishida is not in terms 
of market logics (privacy ‘have’s and ‘have nots’) but his attempt to find a practical 
and non-deontological method to formalize an objective right of subjective life. This 
has precedent too in what Murata (2019) accounts for as ‘vocational ethics,’ a tradi-
tional, practical, and civically minded approach to ethics and commerce, rather than 
dehumanised modes of neoliberal exchange.
7.4  Spice 4: Heart and the Value of Sensitivity to “Synthetic” Life
Of Japan and social robots, Robertson (2018) describes the extension of Shinto-
based religious rites to the disposal of robots, such as Sony’s AIBO. Katsuno (2011) 
helps explain this, stating that for English speakers, ‘heart’ is a human phenomenon 
and that through this we feel emotionally ‘touched’ by others. Katsuno argues how-
ever that the attribution of ‘heart’ (or kokoro) to humanoid robots is pervasive in 
contemporary Japan. This has origins in the 1890s, as the Buddhist-inspired philoso-
pher Minakata accounted for kokoro as ‘heart-mind,’ also describing the ‘inter-work’ 
of substance (mono) with heart-mind. This relationship generated its own form of 
‘causality,’ which is an attempt to bridge subject-object relations by means of what 
events are caused by the intermingling of kokoro and mono, and even feedback 
loops between heart and substance thereafter (Sato, 2019). This affective connec-
tion finds ready expression in human–computer interaction, and personal and social 
experience of synthetic personalities built with affect-sensitive sensors and actua-
tors, albeit of a different character to that inspired by cybernetics, behaviourism, and 
cognitivist outlooks. Sony’s approach to AI ethics is telling, aiming to ‘contribute 
to the development of a peaceful and sustainable society while delivering kando—a 
sense of excitement, wonder, or emotion—to the world’ (Sony, 2019). The ambition 
to move people affectively and emotionally is thus key to Sony’s mission strategy. 
Sony also states that it will utilize AI ‘in a manner harmonized with society’ (which 
is Confucian); that ‘Sony aims to support the exploration of the potential for each 
individual to empower their lives’ (liberal and originally Western); and to contribute 
to enrichment of our culture and push our civilization forward’ (influences of Meiji 
and wakon yōsai) by providing novel and creative types of kando (Shinto, and its 
loosening of subject/object binaries that allow for emotionally charged entities).
On animism itself, as Kitano (2007) notes, Japanese animism is born from quali-
ties of immanence and the existence of spiritual life that is not simply individual 
subjectivity, but relationships with “the whole”. Key is the decentring of sovereign 
subjectivity and the self-positing human at the centre of existence. Again, this is 
an appeal to larger non-human wholes, in favour of a more ecological view that 
accepts that various modes of existence are fused together. Pointing to what he sees 
as a greater sensitivity of the Japanese towards things, Nishida (2003 [1958]: 52) 
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articulates ‘Japanese culture’ as a culture of emotion that derives from a phenom-
enological openness guided by an intention to the full nature of a thing, rather than 
a learned reductionist blinkeredness. Related, Kaplan (2004) argues that ‘Japanese 
people do not oppose the natural and the artificial but on the contrary very often 
use the artificial to recreate nature’ (2004: 5). Interest in honouring nature through 
mimicry stands in contrast to views based on the corruptive influences of technol-
ogy, arguably rooted in Rousseau (2008 [1762]), and the conservative concern with 
preservation of human authenticity and the ruining of a human-centred nature.
Yet, Robertson (2018) notes that the principle of ‘nature’ (shinzen) is very pliable, 
meaning more than environment or ecology (also see Ito, 2016). Rather (like Kami), 
nature exists in multiple forms, in organic and non-organic things. This paper will 
not argue for spirits in things, recognising the tension between animistic beliefs and 
capitalist interests in the design of synthetic personalities. It also sees social dangers 
of emotional AI and synthetic personalities, perhaps foremost in relation to children 
and elderly people experiencing the effects of brain degeneration. Yet, for Spice 4, 
there is ethical and governance value in Japanese sensitivity to the intelligences we 
build and live alongside, specifically given historic understanding of in-betweenness 
of things (especially designed things) and people (Nakada, 2019), which has roots 
in Watsuji- and Heidegger-influenced ideas about interaction as the basis of mean-
ing. This applies well to the psychological experiences of systems where subjects 
and objects may modify (however slightly) each other. As explored then, Japanese 
philosophies encourage experiential openness, sensitivity to contexts, recognition of 
human values in technology, aesthetic and affective awareness of things, and rela-
tionships with synthetic personalities. Spice 4 is thus a policy need for experiential 
sensitivity to objects, systems, synthetic personalities, emergent relationships, and 
the complex interactions that will surely emerge as emotion and affect-based sys-
tems grow more sophisticated in their capacities to simulate understanding of inti-
mate dimensions of human life.
8  Conclusion
With Japan and emotional AI systems in mind, this paper has considered technology 
ethics in relation to non-Western ethical thought and practice. Its starting point was 
the Meiji Restoration that initiated Japan’s first modernity. By assessing both liberal-
inspired philosophers, and those exploring the intersections between Japanese and 
Western understanding of experience, the paper progressed to illustrate interests of 
value to Japanese AI ethics policy, so as not to rely so heavily on ‘dignitarian phi-
losophy’ (Miyashita, 2021). It then made recommendations on factors that might 
be recognised (1) internally within Japan’s national AI policies, and (2) externally 
(internationally) in standards and rights-based debates on how to govern AI tech-
nologies. This is to rebalance ethical debate from what arguably are largely US and 
European normatively dominated debates, but also because the factors are innately 
valuable for discussion of governing AI technologies that judge and interact with 
emotion and other intimate dimensions of human life. Presented as the four Spices 
(the value of a community-based view, aversion to objectification without context, 
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sincere conduct, and sensitivity to emergent relations with technologies), these are 
argued to have application to global conversation on moral principles governing 
emerging AI technologies.
Confucian-led principles of harmony and inter-dependency have much to offer 
because they admit that nature and environments may be technological as well as 
organic. From the point of view of ethics, a harmony-based approach de-emphasises 
individuals (seeing them as one part of a necessary contradiction). Practically, given 
that there are increasingly many questionable uses of data about people that do not 
strictly make use of personal data, such as through synthetic data, or processing that 
stops short of being able to single-out a person yet clearly affects groups of people, 
a harmony-based in-betweenist approach that recognises civic and societal impact is 
normatively welcome to help advance policy on collective data rights.
The cosmological pragmatism of Zen Buddhist–inspired technology ethics sits 
uncomfortably with deontic ethical principles. Yet, it provides a useful ethical impe-
tus for locally and contextually applied governance that recognises change and 
impermanence. From a governance point of view, in relation to smart cities (and 
Japan’s Society 5.0), this is not unlike Green’s (2020) argument for a more direct 
democracy when it comes to companies seeking to roll out new data-oriented appli-
cations in towns and cities. Family, regional, and corporate communities are also 
stressed by Nishigaki (2006), who observes that both in traditional and modernized 
Japanese societies, the communities to which individuals belong have complex fea-
tures in terms of internal behavioural codes. Assuming international and national 
law are in place, dynamic and local ethical contexts may be co-created by citizens 
and non-citizen dialectics (ningen), something that is increasingly necessary as ubiq-
uitous sensing becomes more prevalent in local life.
On privacy harms, these are framed in Japanese policy in terms of dignity, but 
as Miyashita (2021) highlights, this term does not resonate as well in Japan as it 
does in Europe. Respect for Miyashita is a better perspective, a critique arguably 
Confucian in nature, especially regarding the need to take proper measures and not 
to presume intimacy. Ultimately this is about good conduct, providing clear guid-
ance (perhaps more practical and intuitively straightforward than dignity) on the 
need for decorum regarding the collection and processing of personal data. Respect 
can also be expanded to include respect for lived context and the whole from which 
particularities have been taken, to avoid dehumanisation and objectification through 
decontextualization. This gives moral form, for example, to potential harms through 
automated individual decision-making, where important decisions about a person 
(such as workplace performance through emotional AI) are made based on poten-
tially decontextualised data. Such a moral remedy would mean not only the ability 
to challenge the accuracy of data, but also the right to acknowledge the wider situa-
tion that the decontextualised data was taken from.
Finally, the cultural sensitivity of the Japanese to relationships with non-human 
agents, the lack of an absolute divide between artifice and nature, and that the 
artificial can be seen as honouring the organic should be noted. The various tradi-
tions discussed here, and how modern Japanese philosophies of modernity hybrid-
ised these, point to potential for ethical and policy sensitivity to emergent human-
system interactions. These will continue to involve data, but increasingly includes 
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relationships with synthetic agents in phones, playthings, homes, and elsewhere. 
Yet, from the point of view of ethical factors that impact on the design of AI ser-
vices that make use of intimate dimensions of human life, much can be learned glob-
ally from Japan’s affective connections, complex relational factors, and what will be 
much needed experiential sensitivity to relationships with non-humans.
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